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What Real-World Criminal Cases Tell Us
About Genetics Evidence
Deborah W. Denno
Rapid advances in genetic and neuroscience research over the past few decades have
fueled a focus on how such information is viewed and used by the criminal justice
system. Researchers at the University of Utah recently conducted an unprecedented
experimental study indicating that psychopathic criminal offenders are more likely to
receive lighter sentences if a judge was aware of genetic and neurobiological
explanations for the offender’s psychopathy. This Article contends that the study’s
conclusions derive from substantial flaws in the study’s design and methodology. The
hypothetical case upon which the study is based captures just one narrow and
unrepresentative component of how genetic and neurobiological information operates,
and the study suffers from serious omissions that affect the validity and reliability of its
results. It is important to call attention to these problems given that the study’s widely
publicized findings are likely to bolster inaccurate perceptions regarding the dangers of
allowing behavioral genetics evidence in criminal cases. This Article concludes with a
detailed discussion of a number of recent criminal cases involving behavioral genetics
evidence. Familiarity with such cases may improve the real-world applicability of
future experimental studies exploring the influence of genetics evidence on criminal
cases.

* Arthur A. McGivney Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. This Article was
part of a symposium on “From Bench to Society: Law and Ethics at the Frontier of Genetic
Technology.” For insightful comments on earlier versions of this Article, I thank Marianna Gebhardt,
Valerie Hans, Bruce Kreter, and Erin Murphy. Amanda Fachler, Jamie Kringstein, and Zack Cronin
provided excellent research support along with the talented members of Fordham Law School’s
library staff, especially Alissa Black-Dorward, Juan Fernandez, and Herbert Maynor. I am indebted to
three sources for research funding: Fordham Law School, the Fordham University Faculty Research
Grant, and the Arthur and Charlotte Zitrin Foundation. No individual or organization acknowledged
in this Article necessarily supports the Article’s interpretations or conclusions and I am solely
responsible for any mistakes or misjudgments.
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Introduction
A recent study by researchers at the University of Utah found that
psychopathic criminal offenders are more likely to receive a lighter
sentence if a judge was aware of genetic and neurobiological explanations
1
for the offender’s psychopathy. This striking conclusion was widely
2
publicized; indeed, the results of the study were reported in Science, one
1. Lisa G. Aspinwall, Teneille R. Brown, & James Tabery, The Double-Edged Sword: Does
Biomechanism Increase or Decrease Judges’ Sentencing of Psychopaths?, 337 Science 846, 848–49
(2012) [hereinafter The Double-Edged Sword].
2. For a range of news articles discussing the study, see Benedict Carey, Study of Judges Finds
Evidence from Brain Scans Led to Lighter Sentences, N.Y. Times, Late Ed., Aug. 16, 2012, at A12;
Greg Miller, In Mock Case, Biological Evidence Reduces Sentences, 337 Science 778 (2012); Bruce
Bower, Psychopaths Get Time Off for Bad Brains: Biological Evidence May Prompt Sentencing Break
for
Violent
Offenders,
Sci.
News
(Aug. 16,
2012),
http://www.sciencenews.org/
view/generic/id/343095/title/Psychopaths_get_time_off_for_bad_brains; Expert Reaction to Knowledge
About the Biological Basis of Psychopathy and Judges Sentencing, Sci. Media Ctr. (Aug. 16, 2012),
http://www.sciencemediacentre.org/expert-reaction-to-knowledge-about-the-biological-basis-ofpsychopathy-and-judges-sentencing-2; Jessica Hamzelou, Scientific Explanation of Psychopathy Cuts
Jail Time, NewScientist (Aug. 16, 2012, 7:00 PM), http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn22189scientific-explanation-of-psychopathy-cuts-jail-time.html; Mike Jaccarino, ‘I Couldn’t Help Myself’:
Psychos Get Off with Shorter Prison Terms When Judge Hears Expert Testimony on the Biology of the
Illness, MailOnline (Aug. 18, 2012, 11:39 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article2190268/University-Utah-researchers-Psychos-shorter-prison-terms-judge-hears-expert-testimony.html;
Christian Jarrett, Judges Are More Forgiving of a Psychopath When They’re Given a Neurobiological
Explanation for His Condition, Before It’s News (Aug. 16, 2012, 12:10 PM), http://beforeitsnews.com/
science-and-technology/2012/08/judges-are-more-forgiving-of-a-psychopath-when-theyre-given-aneurobiological-explanation-for-his-condition-2454346.html; Douglas Keene, Judges Are Biased in
Favor of Psychopaths Whose “Brains Made Them Do It”, Keene Trial Consulting (Aug. 24, 2012),
http://keenetrial.com/blog/2012/08/24/judges-are-biased-in-favor-of-psychopaths-whose-brains-madethem-do-it/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=judges-are-biased-in-favor-ofpsychopaths-whose-brains-made-them-do-it; Kate Kelland, Biology Gives American Psychopaths a
Legal Break, Reuters (Aug. 16, 2012, 3:30 PM), http://averaorg.adam.com/content.aspx?
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of the world’s most reputable scientific journals. The study is also
noteworthy as being the first of its kind. Although rapid advances in
genetic and neuroscience research over the past few decades have focused
attention on how such information is viewed and used by the criminal
4
justice system, this study is the first to experimentally test the influence of
5
genetics evidence on judges’ sentencing decisions. The study’s authors—
6
professors in psychology, law, and philosophy —have diverse backgrounds
that seem ideally suited for such a bold and ambitious project.
Unfortunately, the study is also significantly flawed. Problems with
both the design and the methodology call into question the study’s findings
and its potential impact. The study’s conclusions, for example, can feed
fears that defendants who are genetically predisposed to anti-social
behavior may be “let off the hook” due to the very genetic predispositions
7
that purportedly hardwire them for lives of crime. This perception of the
influence of genetics on crime and punishment has long been
8
perpetuated by the media, and it may gain further traction now that

productId=16&gid=55485; Brian Maffly, Researchers: Judges Who Consider Genetic Data Go Easier
on Psychopaths, Salt Lake Trib. (Aug. 18, 2012, 9:50 PM), http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/news/
54687899-78/judges-utah-criminal-diagnosis.html.csp; Hamilton Nolan, Brain Scans Explain and Excuse
All Behavior So Just Do What You Want, Gawker (Aug. 17, 2012, 11:15 AM), http://gawker.com/
5935656/brain-scans-explain-and-excuse-all-behavior-so-just-do-what-you-want; Stephanie Pappas, Why
Psychopathy May Not Be the Best Defense, LiveScience (Aug. 16, 2012, 2:00 PM), http://www.
livescience.com/22430-psychopathy-courtroom-defense.html; Natasha Pinoi, Biology Influences
Judges’ Sentencing, Am. Ass’n for the Advancement of Sci. (Aug. 17, 2012), http://chinese.
eurekalert.org/en/pub_releases/2012-08/aaft-bij081312.php; Psychopaths Get a Break from Biology:
Judges Reduce Sentences If Genetics, Neurobiology Are Blamed, Sci. Daily (Aug. 16, 2012), http://
www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2012/08/120816121825.htm; Alix Spiegel, Would Judge Give
Psychopath with Genetic Defect Lighter Sentence?, Nat’l Pub. Radio (Aug. 17, 2012), http://m.npr.org/
news/front/158944525; Maia Szalavitz, My Brain Made Me Do It: Psychopaths and Free Will, TIME
(Aug. 17, 2012), http://healthland.time.com/2012/08/17/my-brain-made-me-do-it-psychopaths-and-freewill; Benjamin Wood, Study: Judges Reduce Sentences When Mental Disorder Explanations Are Heard,
Deseret News (Aug. 16, 2012, 12:52 PM), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/865560793/StudyJudges-reduce-sentences-when-mental-disorder-explanations-are-heard.html; Ainsley Young, Study:
Psychopaths Might Get Shorter Sentences, Daily Utah Chron. (Aug. 21, 2012), http://www.
dailyutahchronicle.com/?p=2573931.
3. Johan Bollen et al., Journal Status, 69 Scientometrics 669, 675 (2006) (concluding after an empirical
assessment that Science is one of the most “top-ranked” and “highly prestigious” scientific journals).
4. See generally Deborah W. Denno, Courts’ Increasing Consideration of Behavioral Genetics
Evidence in Criminal Cases: Results of a Longitudinal Study, 2011 Mich. St. L. Rev. 967 [hereinafter
Longitudinal Study] (reviewing the literature on genetics and crime in the context of a unique study of
the use of behavioral genetics evidence in criminal cases decided between 1994 and 2011); James S.
Walker & William Bernet, Neuroscience and Legal Proceedings, in The Origins of Antisocial
Behavior: A Developmental Perspective 237, 237–59 (Christopher R. Thomas & Kayla Pope eds.,
2012) (providing a thorough discussion of the admissibility and use of modern genetic and
neuroscientific techniques and information in legal proceedings).
5. The Double-Edged Sword, supra note 1, at 846 (“[T]he effect of biomechanical evidence on
judges’ reasoning in sentencing has yet to be experimentally tested.”).
6. Id. at 846 n.1.
7. Longitudinal Study, supra note 4, at 970.
8. Id. at 969.
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scientific research offers supposed confirmation. An alternative and
equally disturbing interpretation of the genetics-crime-sentencing link is
that biological explanations for crime may be used to mask racism and
9
eugenics, and as possible grounds for prosecutorial misuse. There is
extensive evidence that such beliefs are inaccurate, but those who hold
these views nonetheless seem to feel that genetics evidence should never
be allowed inside a courtroom; it is argued to be too damning and
10
powerful. The findings of this study could be interpreted, however
remotely, to support such a viewpoint. This rendition may not be
advocated by the study’s authors, but many researchers have faced the
daunting reality of having little control over how the results of their work
are disseminated or applied.
Part I of this Article provides a more detailed description of the study
(hereinafter referred to as the “sentencing study”). Part II discusses the
sentencing study’s faulty experimental design and methodology, beginning
by addressing one of the study’s most puzzling aspects—its narrow focus
on the yet unrecognized diagnosis of psychopathy. Part II then analyzes
the ways in which the hypothetical case that serves as the basis for the
experiment is substantially different from the typical criminal case
involving genetics evidence. Part III explains the gene-environment
interaction that is a facet of virtually every criminal case involving
behavioral genetics evidence and explores the ramifications of the
sentencing study’s failure to account for this interaction. Finally, Part IV
further probes the complexity of the gene-environment interaction by
describing a number of real cases that involve behavioral genetics
evidence.

I. The Sentencing Study
The sentencing study was presented to 181 state trial judges as a set of
facts about a hypothetical defendant, Jonathan Donahue, who attacked a
restaurant manager with blows to the head because the manager initially
11
refused to give Donahue money. The manager suffered brain damage as

9. Id. at 972–73.
10. Id. at 967–75.
11. See The Double-Edged Sword, supra note 1, at 846; Lisa G. Aspinwall et al., Supplementary
Materials for The Double-Edged Sword: Does Biomechanism Increase or Decrease Judges’ Sentencing
of Psychopaths?, Science (Aug. 17, 2012), at 6–12, http://www.sciencemag.org/content/337/6096/846/
suppl/DC1 [hereinafter Supplementary Materials]. The sentencing study explains that state court
administrators were contacted by email in all fifty states to distribute an anonymous online survey to
their judges. However, only nineteen of the administrators sent the email to their respective judges. Id.
at 2–3 (“Participants and the Recruitment Procedure”). The authors never report the potential bias of
examining responses from judges in only nineteen of the fifty states. More importantly, they never
report how many judges in those nineteen states refused to participate compared to the number that
did participate. While the authors wished to protect the anonymity of the responding judges, this
information would have been available regardless because it entailed merely comparing the number of
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a result of the attack, as well as disabilities related to his memory and fine
motor skills. Donahue was found guilty of aggravated battery but was
12
acquitted of robbery because he left the money at the scene of the crime.
13
The study asked the judges what type of sentence Donahue deserved.
In the hypothetical instructions provided to them, all of the judges
received an “expert evaluation” in which a psychiatrist stated that
14
Donahue had been diagnosed as a psychopath. The judges were then
randomly assigned to one of four groups, each with a different combination
of two criteria: (1) whether the expert evaluation was presented by the
prosecution as an aggravating factor or by the defense as a mitigating
factor, and (2) whether the judges heard additional testimony by a
neurobiologist who offered genetic and neurobiological explanations for
15
the development of psychopathy.
The sentencing study determined that in real life, the judges
typically sentenced offenders who were convicted of aggravated battery
16
to an average sentence of nine years. This nine-year number was used
as a basis for comparison with the average length of Donahue’s
hypothetical sentence. The authors found that judges who were not
presented with additional neurobiological evidence regarding psychopathy
17
sentenced Donahue to an average of 13.93 years. The authors interpreted
the length of this sentence—which was substantially longer than the nineyear baseline—as an indication that the judges generally regarded
Donahue’s psychopathy as an aggravating factor because it increased his
18
likelihood of engaging in future violence. However, judges who were
presented with additional neurobiological evidence regarding psychopathy
19
gave Donahue an average sentence of 12.83 years. From these results, the
sentencing study’s authors concluded that a psychopathic diagnosis is a
double-edged sword: For some judges it aggravates an offender’s sentence,
20
21
whereas for others, explanatory biomechanisms mitigate the sentence.

state trial judges in a particular state with the number of judges who actually responded in that state.
12. The Double-Edged Sword, supra note 1, at 846; Supplementary Materials, supra note 11, at 6–
12. An added complicating component to this scenario is that the facts do not depict an average
aggravated assault case because Donahue still engaged in an attempted armed robbery even though he
did not leave with any money. Therefore the hypothetical characterizes an aggravated assault with an
underlying unpunished armed robbery, factors that may well have weighed heavily with the judges and
also introduced some noise to the measures.
13. The Double-Edged Sword, supra note 1, at 846–47.
14. The Double-Edged Sword, supra note 1, at 846; Supplementary Materials, supra note 11, at 9–10.
15. See The Double-Edged Sword, supra note 1, at 846–47.
16. Id. at 847.
17. Id. at 846–47.
18. Id. at 847–48.
19. Id. at 847.
20. It is unclear what the authors of the study mean by the word “biomechanism.” There are
three definitions of biomechanism in the Oxford English Dictionary Online—two of which are
described as “rare.” Definition 1-b comes closest to approximating how the term is used in The
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This Article questions this conclusion, however, because of the
troublesome aspects of the study’s design and methodology. In some
instances these problems are so pervasive that it is difficult to understand
what the authors are attempting to measure. Part II of this Article
discusses the most significant of these problems.

II. The Sentencing Study’s Problems
A. The “Diagnosis” of Psychopathy
One of the more inexplicable and questionable aspects of the
sentencing study is the authors’ decision to feature a hypothetical
defendant with psychopathy. The authors do not acknowledge or explain
their choice to focus exclusively on a condition that is, at present, not fully
recognized or diagnostically accepted in the medical community.
Psychopathy is not listed in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
22
Disorders: Fifth Edition (“DSM-V”), nor has psychopathy been included
23
in any prior edition of the DSM. While there have been pointed criticisms
of the DSM-V and its proposed diagnostic models for personality
24
disorders, the DSM is still considered a mainstay of the classification of

Double-Edged Sword, that being “[t]he ordered sequence or pattern of interdependent events
involved in a biological or biochemical process.” See Biomechanism, Oxford Eng. Dictionary
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/275620?redirectedFrom=biomechanism#eid (last visited July 30, 2013).
As William Bernet, M.D., notes: “The word ‘biomechanism’ is not a commonly used word in scientific
writing. . . . There are very few articles in the medical literature that have used that word previously.”
E-mail from William Bernet, Professor Emeritus, Dep’t of Psychiatry, Vanderbilt Univ. Sch. of Med.,
to Deborah W. Denno, Arthur A. McGivney Professor of Law, Fordham Univ. Sch. of Law (Mar. 25,
2013, 2:15 PM) (on file with author).
21. See The Double-Edged Sword, supra note 1, at 846–49.
22. See generally Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-V].
23. Much has been written about the past exclusion of psychopathy from the DSM, especially
with respect to the DSM’s section on Antisocial Personality Disorder, the classification most closely
associated with psychopathy. See Stephen J. Morse, Psychopathy and the Law: The United States
Experience, in Responsibility and Psychopathy: Interfacing Law, Psychiatry, and Philosophy 41
(Luca Malatesti & John McMillan eds., 2010) (contrasting psychopathy with antisocial personality
disorder, a condition that is recognized by the DSM); see also Robert D. Hare, Psychopathy: A
Clinical Construct Whose Time Has Come, 23 Crim. Just. & Behav. 25 (1996) (discussing the history of
psychopathy as a construct and the development of psychometric tools for its assessment).
24. For a detailed account of the history of the DSM, as well as a critique of the creation process
for the DSM-V and overly broad nature of the DSM in general, see generally Gary Greenberg, The
Book of Woe: The DSM and the Unmaking of Psychiatry (2013). For a deeper analysis of the
proposed diagnostic models for personality disorders for the DSM-V, as well as a critique of these
models and their impact, see generally Andrew E. Skodol, Personality Disorders in DSM-5, 8 Ann.
Rev. Clinical Psychol. 317 (2012); Leslie C. Morey & Andrew E. Skodol, Convergence Between
DSM-IV-TR and DSM-5 Diagnostic Models for Personality Disorder: Evaluation of Strategies for
Establishing Diagnostic Thresholds, 19 J. Psychiatric Prac. 179 (2013). In addition to such critiques,
others discuss how the APA changed course in proposing and then omitting the term psychopathy in
the DSM-V. See Donald R. Lynam & David D. Vachon, Antisocial Personality Disorder in DSM-5:
Missteps and Missed Opportunities, 3 Personality Disorders: Theory, Res., & Treatment 483, 489
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psychiatric disorders, “the Bible of psychiatry, providing a scriptural basis
25
for the profession.” There are reasons why psychopathy has been
consistently excluded from the DSM, no matter how controversial some
26
may view them. In brief, the medical community’s understanding of
27
psychopathy is far less established than that of many other conditions.
Yet there are also strong negative connotations associated with the term
28
psychopathy that make it a quizzical and emotionally laden choice as the
sole diagnosis in a study’s hypothetical. The sentencing study’s authors
29
themselves describe psychopathy as “a diagnosis with much stigma.”
In the sentencing study, a substantial number of judges claimed to
possess varying degrees of knowledge about psychopathy before their
30
participation, but there is no way of knowing whether their familiarity is
more nuanced than that of the general public. Thus, the stigma associated
with psychopathy cannot be discounted when interpreting the judges’
sentencing decisions. For that matter, the study’s authors arguably added
to that stigma by instructing the judges that “rehabilitation was not an
alternative” for Donahue, “as large-scale treatment has to date been
31
ineffective for adult psychopaths.” This perplexing directive on the part
of the authors substantially loaded the dice in favor of the judges’
sentencing decisions being influenced by considerations of future
dangerousness or retribution. The statement reinforces the stereotype
that both psychopaths and individuals with a genetic link to their behavior
are immutable and hardwired for crime. It also implies that psychopaths
and those with a genetic condition differ from other offenders in their
resistance to treatment and rehabilitation, when in fact, rehabilitation has
32
generally been ineffective for all sorts of offenders. Nonetheless, by

(2012) (“Our third major criticism of the DSM-V proposal for ASPD [Antisocial Personality
Disorder] is that it represents a missed opportunity to reunite two constructs that have grown slightly
apart over time—ASPD and psychopathy.”).
25. Greenberg, supra note 24, at 15.
26. See supra note 23; Lynam & Vachon, supra note 24, at 489.
27. See generally Joanna M. Berg et al., Misconceptions Regarding Psychopathic Personality:
Implications for Clinical Practice and Research, 3 Neuropsychiatry 63 (2013).
28. Id. at 64 (noting that “[p]sychopathic personality (psychopathy) is a widely misunderstood
psychological disorder” plagued by mischaracterizations that “may be fueled by media depictions of
extraordinary violence or audacity” or by stereotyped personas depicted “as deranged and out of
touch with reality”—inaccuracies that have been adopted by standard reference sources and have
become synonymous with such labels as “insane person, lunatic, mad person, maniac, mental case,
nutcase, psycho and psychotic, among others”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
29. The Double-Edged Sword, supra note 1, at 849.
30. Supplementary Materials, supra note 11, at 5.
31. See The Double-Edged Sword, supra note 1, at 849.
32. Joan Petersilia & Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing and Corrections: Overlapping and Inseparable
Subjects, in The Oxford Handbook of Sentencing and Corrections 3, 15–16 (Joan Petersilia &
Kevin R. Reitz eds., 2012) (describing the issue of whether rehabilitation works as “the most
challenging question in corrections” and noting that only 5–15% reductions in recidivism result from
even the most innovative “evidence-based treatment practices and principles”).
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removing even the prospect of rehabilitation, the authors essentially
33
eliminated one of the judges’ key grounds for mitigation. It therefore
comes as no surprise that judges sentenced psychopaths more harshly or
34
listed more aggravating factors than mitigating factors in their reasoning.
The authors purported to test the influence of the defendant’s
diagnosis of psychopathy on the judges’ decisions, but the study did not
35
include a control group. It is unclear why, at least for some of the judges,
the facts of the hypothetical Donahue case were not modified to portray
the defendant as having no psychopathy diagnosis. In addition, the authors
could have substituted a more established diagnosis, such as antisocial
personality disorder, which was included in the DSM-V as well as all prior
36
DSM editions (apart from the first, at least terminologically). Notably,
37
the defendant in Mobley v. State, the real-life case upon which the
38
hypothetical Donahue case is supposedly based, claimed that he suffered
39
from antisocial personality disorder. Yet the sentencing study’s authors
deviated from Mobley in a number of incomprehensible ways, which are
explained further in Part II.C.
With respect to whether psychopaths are sentenced more harshly
than other defendants, the authors used a sentencing baseline of nine
years as a point of comparison. In theory, nine years represents the
average sentence returned by the judges for aggravated battery crimes in
40
their daily practice. However, the authors themselves admit that the
nine-year baseline was not a controlled statistic because they encountered
41
numerous difficulties in reaching that number. This Article does not
33. See infra notes 88–92 (discussing the flexible standards for mitigating evidence).
34. See The Double-Edged Sword, supra note 1, at 847–48; Supplementary Materials, supra note 11,
at 23–24.
35. See The Double-Edged Sword, supra note 1, at 846.
36. See DSM-V, supra note 22, at 659–63; see also supra note 23 and accompanying text. Apart
from the first DSM, all DSM editions (II, III, III-R, IV, IV-R, and V) contain a section on Antisocial
Personality Disorder. See Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders 7 (1st ed. 1952) [hereinafter DSM-I]; Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders 43 (2d ed. 1968); Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders 317–21 (3d ed. 1980); Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 342–46 (3d Revised ed. 1987); Am. Psychiatric Ass’n,
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 645–49 (4th ed. 1994); Am. Psychiatric
Ass’n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 701–06 (4th Revised ed. 2000);
DSM-V, supra note 22, at 659–63. The initial DSM contained terms similar to Antisocial Personality
Disorder but the exact label did not appear until DSM-II. See DSM-I, supra.
37. 455 S.E.2d 61 (Ga. 1995).
38. See The Double-Edged Sword, supra note 1, at 846.
39. See Deborah W. Denno, Behavioral Genetics Evidence in Criminal Cases: 1994–2007, in The
Impact of Behavioral Sciences on Criminal Law 317–54, 465–98 (Nita A. Farahany ed., 2009),
[hereinafter Genetics Evidence]; Deborah W. Denno, Legal Implications of Genetics and Crime
Research, in Genetics of Criminal and Antisocial Behaviour: Symposium No. 194 248 (Gregory R.
Bock & Jamie A. Goode eds., 1996).
40. See The Double-Edged Sword, supra note 1, at 846.
41. For example, the hypothetical aggravated battery presented in the sentencing study may have
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discuss many of these drawbacks because it would be redundant to
rehash them, despite their seriousness. What is clear from the study’s
42
description is that the judges’ estimates were unreliable.

B. DONAHUE Is Atypical
The hypothetical case of Jonathan Donahue serves as the basis for
43
the sentencing study’s experiment, yet the case differs significantly from
a typical behavioral genetics criminal case. This Author’s own research
consisted of a survey of all criminal cases addressing behavioral genetics
44
evidence over a seventeen year period (1994–2011) and revealed several
common characteristics. This Article focuses on my findings from the last
four years of the survey (June 1, 2007 to July 1, 2011), because the use of
behavioral genetics evidence was particularly prevalent during this period
and the timing corresponds well to the date of the sentencing study.
In total, the survey found thirty-three criminal cases that considered
45
behavioral genetics evidence from 2007 to 2011. To compile these cases,
been more severe or included more aggravating factors than the judges’ typical real-life aggravated
battery cases. Moreover, estimates of judges’ personal averages “were collected after exposure to the
complete case and thus were potentially influenced by its aggravated nature.” See supra note 12 and
accompanying text (referring to evidence that Donahue had engaged in an attempted robbery);
Supplementary Materials, supra note 11, at 19. While the study’s authors explain that the “analyses may
have overcontrolled for some of the aggravating aspects of the case,” there is no definite support for
that conclusion. Id. at 19. Indeed, the authors concede that the judges’ personal average sentences for
aggravated battery covered a very wide spectrum, ranging from 0.5 to 30 years, with “significant
variability by State of Adjudication.” Id. at 18. With only nineteen states represented in the study and
an “unequal distribution of judges” across the represented states, the authors were confined to only
five states with respect to the kinds of effects that they could control. Id. at 15, 22. Notably, six judges
did not even have a criminal docket and were instructed to adopt an average sentence of ten years. Id.
at 21 n.1.
42. The nine-year baseline was based on the judges’ responses to the following question: “In your
state of [State of Adjudication], approximate what you believe or know to be the minimum
(maximum) sentence for cases of aggravated battery (in years).” Supplementary Materials, supra note
11, at 13 (emphasis omitted). There are several problems with reliance on this information. First, the
“judges’ estimates of the average or standard sentence for aggravated battery in their state of
adjudication” were so variable within the state that the authors could not use them to create a
sufficiently reliable state average in order to control for sentencing differences across states. Id. at 22.
Second, nearly 25% of the participating judges stated that they were unaware of their state’s average
sentence for aggravated battery, thereby winnowing the sample of respondents for this question down
to only 125 judges. Id. Because of the variability resulting from so many judges not knowing the
average sentence within their state, the authors could not compare the sentences provided for the
hypothetical case against “each judge’s respective state average.” Id. Third, there was substantial
variability in sentencing across states, with some states indicating “a stronger trend toward mitigation
than others.” Id. Because of these problems, the authors recommended that any additional research in
this area survey judges only from states with comparable sentencing guidelines, and that judges’
estimates of personal and state averages be gathered before the judges are provided with a
hypothetical case. Id.
43. See The Double-Edged Sword, supra note 1, at 846; Supplementary Materials, supra note 11, at 6–12.
44. See Longitudinal Study, supra note 4, at 971; see also Denno, Genetics Evidence, supra note
39, at 465–98.
45. Longitudinal Study, supra note 4, at 991.
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I relied solely on legal research databases, a strategy that excludes less
accessible cases but ensures a systematic and replicable process across
46
different states and years. All but one of the thirty-three cases ended up
as a capital case in which the defendant was initially sentenced to death
47
by a judge or jury. The single exception was a life imprisonment case in
which the defendant claimed that he was tried and adjudicated while
48
incompetent to stand trial. It is therefore clear that behavioral genetics
49
evidence appears to arise with the greatest frequency in capital cases.
Although the courts in the survey were usually open to admitting
50
behavioral genetics evidence either at trial or in post-trial proceedings,
the evidence was most frequently offered for mitigation purposes in the
51
penalty phase of a capital trial. During sentencing, genetics evidence
can have life-or-death significance for a defendant. In ten of the thirtythree cases in the survey, defendants originally sentenced to death had
52
their death sentences vacated on appeal. In seven of those ten cases,
counsels’ failures to adequately investigate or present behavioral genetics
evidence (typically in addition to other factors) were grounds for
vacating the death sentence and remanding the case for imposition of a
53
sentence of life in prison.

46. Id. at 991–92.
47. Id. at 993, 1029 chart 1.
48. Id.; Morris v. Malfi, No. C 06-7409 SI, 2010 WL 2629738, at *11, *16 (N.D. Cal. June 29, 2010),
aff’d, 449 F. App’x 686 (9th Cir. 2011) (denying writ of habeas corpus on the basis that the new
evidence did not raise real questions of Morris’ incompetence at the time of the crime, but issuing a
certificate of appealability).
49. See Longitudinal Study, supra note 4, at 993; Denno, Genetics Evidence, supra note 39, at 465–98.
50. See Longitudinal Study, supra note 4, at 1033 chart 5.
51. For a discussion of the role and meaning of mitigation evidence, see infra notes 80–92 and
accompanying text.
52. See Detrich v. Ryan, 619 F.3d 1038, 1069 (9th Cir. 2010), vacated, 131 S. Ct. 2449 (2011) (vacating
Detrich’s death sentence and remanding the case to the district court); Hamilton v. Ayers, 583 F.3d
1100, 1136 (9th Cir. 2009) (remanding the case to Tulane County Superior Court with instructions to
reduce defendant’s sentence to life imprisonment without parole); Jones v. Ryan, 583 F.3d 626, 647 (9th
Cir. 2009), vacated, 131 S. Ct. 2091 (2011) (reversing and remanding the case with instructions to issue a
writ of habeas corpus); Morales v. Mitchell, 507 F.3d 916, 942 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding that the defendant
was entitled to a writ of habeas corpus and a vacating of his death sentence); Allison v. Cullen, 725 F.
Supp. 2d 924, 925 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (vacating the death sentence and granting relief on the defendant’s
ineffective assistance of counsel claim); Ex parte Smith, No. 1080973, 2010 WL 4148528, at *13 (Ala. Oct.
22, 2010) (remanding the case for another penalty-phase hearing); Hall v. McPherson, 663 S.E.2d 659,
670 (Ga. 2008) (upholding the habeas court’s vacation of the defendant’s death sentence); Woodall v.
Simpson, No. 5:06 CV-P216-R, 2009 WL 464939, at *55 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 24, 2009) (vacating the death
sentence and remanding the case to state trial court); Malone v. State, 168 P.3d 185, 215, 230 (Okla.
Crim. App. 2007) (reversing the defendant’s death sentence); Commonwealth v. Williams, Nos.
200001876, 200002869, 2010 Pa. D. & C. 4th LEXIS 193, at *15 (Pa. D. & C. May 13, 2010) (vacating the
death sentence and sentencing the defendant to life in prison).
53. See Detrich, 619 F.3d at 1065, 1068–69 (vacating the death sentence on finding that failure to
introduce mitigating evidence of Detrich’s neuropsychological damage, along with his traumatic and
abusive childhood, constituted ineffective assistance of counsel); Hamilton, 583 F.3d at 1135–36
(reducing defendant’s sentence to life imprisonment without parole on finding that failure to
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For the remainder of this Article, I will draw upon the characteristics
of the typical behavioral genetics case, as revealed by my survey, to
consider how closely the sentencing study’s hypothetical Donahue case
reflects legal reality. The remainder of this Part focuses particularly on the
facts of the Donahue case and the legal constructs applied to its resolution.

C. DONAHUE Is Not a Capital Case
The hypothetical Donahue case is not based on a capital crime.
Indeed, the facts of most criminal cases involving behavioral genetics
evidence are far more egregious than those presented in Donahue. The
authors of the sentencing study claim that the hypothetical Donahue case
54
is “loosely based” upon the real case of Mobley v. State, but the reality
is that “Jonathan Donahue” and Stephen Mobley have little of substance
in common, making a comparison between the two cases an empty
55
stretch. In 1991, Mobley robbed a Domino’s Pizza store in Georgia.
During the robbery, Mobley shot the store’s manager in the head while
56
the young man begged for his life. Mobley was soon caught and
57
immediately confessed to the robbery and murder. Mobley was young
(aged twenty-five), white, came from an affluent family, and there was no
58
evidence that he had ever been neglected or physically abused. Yet
Mobley had a long, steady history of personal and behavioral disorders
that became worse with age, led to a prison sentence for forgery, and
ultimately culminated in numerous armed robberies while he was in his
59
mid-twenties. It was after this crime spree that Mobley robbed and
60
murdered the Domino’s Pizza manager. While awaiting trial for the
manager’s death, Mobley fought with other inmates, sodomized his
cellmate, verbally taunted and threatened prison guards, and defiantly
investigate and present evidence of defendant’s childhood and mental health history was prejudicial to
the defendant); Jones, 583 F.3d at 643, 647 (issuing a writ of habeas on finding that defense counsel
had failed to conduct a reasonable mitigation investigation and present sufficient witnesses and
evidence at sentencing); Morales, 507 F.3d at 942 (vacating the death sentence on finding that failure
of the defense counsel to conduct an investigation into mitigating evidence of alcoholism in the family,
Morales’ own alcoholism and its effects on him, and his upbringing constituted ineffective assistance of
counsel); Allison, 725 F. Supp. 2d at 925 (granting relief on Allison’s ineffective assistance of counsel
for failure to present mitigating evidence claim, as well as several other claims); Hall, 663 S.E.2d at 664
(upholding vacation of death sentence on finding that the defendant’s trial counsel should have
investigated further into his background and that failure to do so was the result of inattention rather
than a strategic decision); Williams, 2010 Pa. D. & C. 4th LEXIS 193, at *15 (vacating the death
sentence on finding that Williams was developmentally disabled and therefore ineligible for the death
penalty).
54. See The Double-Edged Sword, supra note 1, at 846.
55. Mobley v. State, 426 S.E.2d 150, 151 (Ga. 1993).
56. Denno, Genetics Evidence, supra note 39, at 325.
57. See Mobley, 426 S.E.2d at 115.
58. Denno, Genetics Evidence, supra note 39, at 325; Turpin, 502 S.E.2d at 463–64.
59. Denno, Genetics Evidence, supra note 39, at 325.
60. Id.
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tattooed the word “Domino” on his own back. Counseling and
62
punishment seemed to have no effect on his behavior.
In contrast, the hypothetical defendant Jonathan Donahue did not
murder the store manager but rather engaged in assault and attempted
robbery (although the sentencing study does not mention the charge of
63
attempted robbery). Additionally, he left the money at the scene of the
crime. Donahue’s conviction for aggravated assault resulted from inflicting
injuries that were not life-threatening and posed relatively minor longterm consequences. Furthermore, Donahue seemingly had no criminal
record and no history of violence or behavioral disorders. The only
apparent similarities to the case of Stephen Mobley are minor: the
defendant’s age, his victim’s occupation, and a lack of remorse for his
crime. Like Mobley, Donahue’s lack of remorse stands out; Donahue
boasts about his actions and gets a tattoo symbolic of the scene of his crime
but the far less serious nature of Donahue’s crime greatly diminishes the
64
impact of such behavior.
It is unclear why the sentencing study’s authors limited Donahue’s
crime to aggravated battery given that murder is the crime most commonly
61. Id.
62. See Daniel A. Summer, The Use of Human Genome Research in Criminal Defense and
Mitigation of Punishment, in Genetics and Criminality: The Potential Misuse of Scientific
Information in Court 182, 189 (Jeffrey R. Botkin et al. eds., 1999) (“Mobley’s parents made numerous
efforts to correct their son’s deviant behavior by traditional forms of punishment, reform school and
intensive psychological counseling. All efforts to modify Mobley’s behavior were unsuccessful . . . .”).
63. See supra note 12 (discussing the sentencing study’s omission of an attempted robbery charge).
64. Supplementary Materials, supra note 11, at 6–7. The Jonathan Donahue vignette is as follows:
Jonathan Donahue (age 24 at the time) entered a Burger King restaurant at midnight on
February 17, 2008, brandishing a loaded, semi-automatic pistol. He demanded money from the
store manager, William Porter, who was standing behind the till. Porter was 25 years old at the
time and had no previous relation to Donahue. When Porter did not initially respond to the
demand for money, Donahue forced him to his knees and then struck him forcefully and
repeatedly in the back of the head with the pistol. Donahue later said he struck Porter because
“that fat son-of-a-bitch wouldn’t stop crying.” Donahue ran off without taking any money.
Donahue was eventually arrested and confessed to battering Porter at the Burger King.
Porter’s blood was also found on the pistol that was obtained from Donahue’s car.
Porter sustained moderate, permanent brain damage from the forceful blows to his
head. He was in the hospital, in a coma for 20 days, but has since come out of the coma and
returned to his home. However, Porter continues to have difficulty remembering many
words and controlling his fine motor movement (such as holding pencils or typing).
Donahue bragged about his actions at Burger King to fellow pre-trial detainees, and he
boasted about his assault on Porter to jail staff. He also had a king’s crown tattooed on his
back.
The Trial
Donahue was charged with aggravated battery (an unlawful touching of the person of
another with a deadly weapon) and armed robbery (illegal taking of property in the
presence of a person by violence or intimidation).
In February 2010, a jury found Donahue guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated
battery, but he was acquitted of armed robbery as the evidence pointed to his not leaving
the Burger King with any money.
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associated with the use of expert genetic testimony. The authors
submitted that if Donahue had been “found guilty of murder and had thus
faced either the death sentence or life in prison without the possibility of
parole, then future dangerousness would have lost its appeal as the
defendant might have been incarcerated for life with no potential to
66
reoffend.” This rationale is dubious for several reasons. First, even among
those defendants sentenced to death, nearly one-fifth are never actually
67
executed. Therefore, a judge does not know a defendant’s fate with
certainty at the time of sentencing. Moreover, even in prison, convicted
murderers are considered by the legal and prison system to be more
68
69
dangerous than other convicts. Prison violence is a serious matter, and it
is difficult to imagine that a judge would not take that knowledge into
account.
Finally, even if the authors are correct in speculating that judges
would not consider the future dangerousness of a convicted murderer, that
perception does not change the reality that most criminal cases addressing
70
behavioral genetics involve capital crimes. My survey did not find any
cases from 2007 to 2011 in which the State introduced behavioral genetics
factors as aggravating evidence or as an indication that a defendant posed
a future danger to others. The sentencing study’s authors may believe that
these findings indicate a general consensus that future dangerousness is a
superfluous consideration for defendants convicted of serious crimes.
However, that presumption seems to be a proposed explanation for an
outcome rather than a rationale for selecting a less serious crime solely to
decrease the likelihood of that outcome.

D. The Sentencing Study Uses Misleading Legal Constructs
The sentencing study refers to “aggravating” and “mitigating”
71
factors. These terms are grounded in legal reality and can be found in
72
statutes and guidelines applicable to both noncapital and capital cases.
The sentencing study, however, defines aggravating and mitigating

65. See supra notes 45–51 and accompanying text.
66. The Double-Edged Sword, supra note 1, at 849.
67. Death Penalty Info. Ctr., The Death Penalty in 2010 Year End Report (2010). The first
chart shows the number of people who have been executed. Id. at 1. There is also a table showing the
number of death sentences. Id. at 3. The ratio of death sentences handed down between 1976 and 2010
to those actually carried out during that period was about 16%, or one in six. Id.
68. See Mark D. Cunningham, Dangerousness and Death: A Nexus in Search of Science and
Reason, 61 Am. Psychologist 828, 831 (2006).
69. See generally Kristine Levan, Prison Violence: Causes, Consequences and Solutions (2012).
70. See supra notes 47–49 and accompanying text.
71. The Double-Edged Sword, supra note 1, at 846.
72. See Office of Gen. Counsel, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Aggravating and Mitigating Role
Adjustments Primer, §§ 3B1.1–3B1.2 (Apr. 2012); see, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:44-1 (2010)
(establishing criteria for withholding or imposing sentence of imprisonment).
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factors in a manner that bears little resemblance to their legal definitions.
As part of the study, the judges who heard additional testimony regarding
genetic and neurobiological explanations for the development of
psychopathy responded to questions regarding “their reasoning about the
73
effects of expert testimony concerning psychopathy on judgment.” Two
independent evaluators then reviewed these responses and categorized
74
them as being “aggravating” or “mitigating.” The resulting information
is illuminating. For example, a number of responses categorized as
“aggravating” reveal retribution to be a driving force in the judges’
75
sentencing decisions. But there is no basis to assume that the study’s
categorizations correspond with the legal rules that judges are expected to
76
follow when they make sentencing determinations in real life.
These legal rules guide fact finders in determining the outcome of
criminal cases, in sharp contrast to an after-the-fact construction of
“aggravating” and “mitigating” factors employed by the sentencing study.
The role of aggravating and mitigating factors is one of the most
consequential aspects of capital cases, which, as previously mentioned,
constitute the vast majority of criminal cases involving behavioral genetics
evidence. Any real-world application of the sentencing study’s findings
regarding genetics evidence is likely to take place in the context of
capital cases, leaving the authors’ study-specific use of these terms
particularly vulnerable to misinterpretation.
In a capital case, behavioral genetics evidence can be used in two
ways: first, during the guilt-or-innocence phase, which involves a factual
determination about whether a defendant committed the crime, and
second, during the penalty phase, after the jury has found the defendant
to be guilty of a capital crime and then hears both aggravating evidence
from the State and mitigating evidence from the defense to aid in the
77
determination of a capital sentence. Evidence is applied differently
during these two phases. While the guilt-or-innocence phase concerns a
factual inquiry, the penalty phase probes “the moral and normative
78
choice” of whether a defendant “deserve[s] to die.”
The penalty phase is more thorough and well-documented and also
79
most critical in assessing the impact of behavioral genetics evidence. The

73. The Double-Edged Sword, supra note 1, at 848 tbl.1.
74. Id. at 847; see Supplementary Materials, supra note 11, at 23–26.
75. See The Double-Edged Sword, supra note 1, at 848 tbl.1 (setting forth aggravating factors);
Supplementary Materials, supra note 11, at 23–24 (providing sample aggravating reasons offered by
participating judges).
76. See The Double-Edged Sword, supra note 1, at 848 tbl.1 (listing aggravating and mitigating factors).
77. John H. Blume & Emily C. Paavola, Life, Death, and Neuroimaging: The Advantages and
Disadvantages of the Defense’s Use of Neuroimages in Capital CasesLessons from the Front,
62 Mercer L. Rev. 909, 914 (2011).
78. Id. at 915.
79. See Longitudinal Study, supra note 4, 1012–15.
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vast majority of death penalty states require that a fact finder (usually the
jury) consider and weigh both aggravating and mitigating circumstances
80
during the penalty phase. In most jurisdictions, aggravating circumstances
must outweigh mitigating circumstances for a defendant to be sentenced to
81
82
death, although the Supreme Court has recognized exceptions. If a
defendant challenges a death sentence, a reviewing court must reweigh the
83
ratio of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
A defense attorney’s presentation of mitigating evidence usually
includes information about a capital defendant’s pre-crime background
84
and life, while the prosecution’s presentation of aggravating evidence
typically incorporates a defendant’s prior criminal record, if applicable,
85
and the circumstances surrounding the crime. Types of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances vary by state, but there are common statutory
aggravating factors that many jurisdictions share. These include the
following: commission of an offense in an “[e]specially heinous, cruel or
depraved manner;” “[u]se, threatened use or possession of a deadly
weapon;” or commission of an offense expecting to receive something of
86
“pecuniary value.” Statutory mitigating factors can include the “age of
the defendant,” the “defendant’s capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness
87
of the defendant’s conduct,” and other factors.
In 2006, the Supreme Court set forth a substantially open-ended
standard for mitigating evidence, which allows defendants to present
evidence relevant to “any aspect of [the] defendant’s character or record
and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a
88
basis for a sentence less than death.” As a result of this legal framework,
mitigating evidence can be all-encompassing and subjective, moving fact
finders to empathize with a defendant who has committed even very

80. See James R. Acker & Charles S. Lanier, Matters of Life or Death: The Sentencing Provisions
in Capital Punishment Statutes, 31 Crim. L. Bull. 19, 35 (1995) (“Most statutes direct the judge or jury
to consider enumerated aggravating and mitigating circumstances prior to arriving at a sentencing
decision . . . .”).
81. For discussions of these factors and how they interplay, see id. at 33–52; see also O. Carter
Snead, Memory and Punishment, 64 Vand. L. Rev. 1195, 1248–52 (2011).
82. See Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 173, 181 (2006) (upholding a Kansas death penalty statute
that allowed jurors to impose the death penalty when aggravating circumstances were not required to
outweigh mitigating circumstances, including when aggravating and mitigating circumstances were
equally distributed).
83. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534 (2003).
84. See, e.g., Malone v. State, 168 P.3d 185, 223 (Okla. Crim. App. 2007).
85. See, e.g., id. at 229.
86. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13–701(D) (2011) (listing Arizona’s aggravating factors).
87. See, e.g., id. § 13–701(E) (listing Arizona’s mitigating factors).
88. Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 174 (2006) (citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978)). “[A]
state capital sentencing system must: (1) rationally narrow the class of death-eligible defendants; and
(2) permit a jury to render a reasoned, individualized sentencing determination based on a death-eligible
defendant’s record, personal characteristics, and the circumstances of his crime.” Id. at 172–73.
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serious crimes. In one notorious capital case, for example, the sentencing
judge noted that a mitigating circumstance working in the defendant’s
90
favor was the fact “that [the defendant’s] family loved him.” This
evidence would be irrelevant as a defense against a murder conviction. My
research indicates that behavioral genetics evidence is most frequently
used to validate the existence of conditions (such as mental illness or
addiction) that could have been introduced during either the guilt or
91
penalty phases of trial, regardless of any genetic link; yet, the remarkably
flexible standards for mitigating evidence also enable defendants to raise
92
behavioral genetics evidence that goes back generations.
93
The case of Rhoades v. Henry demonstrates how such factors might
interrelate. The defendant presented “a family tree depicting drug and
alcohol abuse, suicide, intelligence, mental health, and criminal
94
convictions,” as well as testimony from a neuropsychologist who linked
together the problems across generations. As the neuropsychologist
explained, “[t]he alcoholism and suicides seen in past generations of [the
defendant’s] family very likely play a genetic role in the emotional and
95
mental health of [the defendant] and his siblings.” Yet it was the more
immediate family circumstances of physical and sexual abuse, in addition
to medical problems and the defendant’s chronic use of
methamphetamine, that “‘may well have damaged [the defendant’s] brain
in areas critical to impulse control and the ability to think clearly in high
96
pressured situations.’” Nonetheless, the court determined that the
aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors and affirmed the
97
defendant’s sentence and convictions.
My survey results suggest that behavioral genetics evidence either
has no decipherable impact on a defendant’s case or it becomes at most
an effective factor alongside other variables in rendering a defendant
ineligible for the death penalty. At the same time, it can be challenging
to isolate the effect of any one piece of mitigating evidence when it
98
comes to interpreting the influences on death penalty sentences. The

89. See Blume & Paavola, supra note 77, at 915 (“[T]his decision is not, at its core, a determination of
fact, for example, did the defendant ‘do it,’ but a moral and normative choice—does he deserve to die?”).
90. Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 470 (2007).
91. See Longitudinal Study, supra note 4, at 1033 chart 5. Note that the total number of cases
exceeds the number of examined cases (thirty-three) because in some cases the evidence was applied
to validate more than one condition.
92. See id. at 967.
93. 638 F.3d 1027 (9th Cir. 2011).
94. Id. at 1048.
95. Id. (quoting declaration by Craig Beavers, Ph.D.).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1052, 1055.
98. See Longitudinal Study, supra note 4, at 1028 (“[I]n most cases, the evidence is so tightly
intertwined with other factors in a defendant’s life that the particular impact of behavioral genetics can be
difficult to isolate.”).
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defense generally introduces a lengthy list of mitigating factors to the
99
court. My analysis of the thirty-three cases gathered from 2007 to 2011
yielded a wide range of behavioral genetic factors that could have
varying degrees of impact on fact finders’ sentencing determinations,
100
depending on the type and quality of evidence at issue. For example,
judges and juries may view the results of specific scientific tests
differently than information related to a defendant’s family history of
mental illness and subsequent schizophrenia diagnosis. These distinctions
could be further affected by other kinds of family and environmental
influences that may be introduced as mitigating evidence, as well as the
many types of aggravating evidence pertaining to the specifics of the crime
or the defendant’s criminal history.
This intertwining of multiple influences packs a punch, both in terms
of the purported correlates of a defendant’s behavior and how his story
101
unfolds in the courtroom. In cases involving behavioral genetics
evidence, the interaction between genetic and environmental factors is
particularly important. Yet the sentencing study does not account for this
interaction, thereby calling into question the validity and reliability of its
findings. Part III addresses these points in more detail.

III. The Sentencing Study Fails to Consider the Interaction
Between Genes and Environment
102
Genes influence behavior but they do not determine behavior. A
person’s genetic makeup impacts her body’s physiology, which in turn
responds to the immediate environment, and only then manifests in a
103
particular course of conduct. Researchers who assess an individual’s
genetic predisposition to certain characteristics (such as mental illness)
examine the interaction between that individual’s genetic makeup and
104
her environmental influences.

99. See id.
100. See id. at 1012–15.
101. See infra notes 103–119 and accompanying text. For an excellent example of a study that
measures multiple variables and interactive effects, see N.J. Schweitzer et al., Neuroimages as
Evidence in a Mens Rea Defense, 17 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 357 (2011).
102. Matt McGue, The End of Behavioral Genetics?, 40 Behav. Genetics 284, 288 (2010).
103. See generally Catherine Baker, Behavioral Genetics: An Introduction to How Genes
and Environments Interact Through Development to Shape Differences in Mood, Personality,
and Intelligence (2004).
104. See, e.g., Robert Plomin et al., Behavioral Genetics 305–33 (5th ed. 2008); Michael Rutter,
Gene-Environmental Interplay: Scientific Issues and Challenges, in Gene-Environment Interactions
in Developmental Psychopathology 3, 3–17 (Kenneth A. Dodge & Michael Rutter eds., 2011);
Serena Bezdjian et al., Psychopathic Personality in Children: Genetic and Environmental
Contributions, 41 Psychol. Med. 589 (2011); Avshalom Caspi et al., Role of Genotype in the Cycle of
Violence in Maltreated Children, 297 Science 851 (2002); Terrie E. Moffitt, The New Look of
Behavioral Genetics in Developmental Psychopathology: Gene-Environment Interplay in Antisocial
Behaviors, 131 Psychol. Bull. 533 (2005).
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As my survey of thirty-three cases from 2007 to 2011 showed, in the
context of a criminal case, there is substantial variety in the nature of the
105
behavioral genetics evidence sought to be admitted. The evidence falls
106
across four overlapping categories: (1) expert testimony, (2) family
107
108
history, (3) behavioral history (such as school records), and (4) medical
109
history (such as medical records). Family history evidence, which is
110
especially comprehensive, is often introduced through the testimony of

105. See Longitudinal Study, supra note 4, at 1012–15.
106. See Rhoades v. Henry, 638 F.3d 1027, 1048 (9th Cir. 2010); Jones v. Ryan, 583 F.3d 626, 634
(9th Cir. 2009); Hamilton v. Ayers, 583 F.3d 1100, 1128 (9th Cir. 2009); Morales v. Mitchell, 507 F.3d
916, 944 (6th Cir. 2007); Allison v. Cullen, No. CV 92-06404 CAS, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82957, at
*168–72 (C.D. Cal. July 22, 2010); Morris v. Malfi, No. C 06-7409 SI, 2010 WL 2629738, at *9 (N.D.
Cal. June 29, 2010); Darling v. Sec’y, No. 6:07-CV-1701-Orl-31GJK, 2010 WL 2471441, at *22–23
(M.D. Fla. June 17, 2010); Creech v. Hardison, No. CV 99-0224-S-BLW, 2010 WL 1338126, at *10 (D.
Idaho Mar. 31, 2010); Henry v. Ryan, No. CV 02-656-PHX-SRB, 2009 WL 692356, at *69 (D. Ariz.
Mar. 17, 2009); Hall v. Quarterman, No. 4:06-CV-436-A, 2009 WL 612559, at *17–18 (N.D. Tex. Mar.
9, 2009); Woodall v. Simpson, No. 5:06CV-P216-R, 2009 WL 464939, at *48 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 24, 2009);
Williams v. Norris, No. 5:07cv00234 SWW, 2008 WL 4820559, at *14 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 4, 2008); Wood
v. Schriro, No. CV-98-053-TUC-JMR, 2007 WL 3124451, at *30 (D. Ariz. Oct. 24, 2007); Schurz v.
Schriro, No. CV-97-580-PHX-EHC, 2007 WL 2808220, at *40–41 (D. Ariz. Sept. 25, 2007); Berryman
v. Ayers, No. 1:95-CV-05309-AWI, 2007 WL 1991049, at *14–15 (E.D. Cal. July 10, 2007); Loving v.
United States, 68 M.J. 1, 14–15 (C.A.A.F. 2009); Brant v. State, 21 So. 3d 1276, 1283 (Fla. 2009);
Simpson v. State, 3 So. 3d 1135, 1139 (Fla. 2009); Hall v. McPherson, 663 S.E.2d 659, 667 (Ga. 2008);
Malone v. State, 168 P.3d 185, 195 (Okla. Crim. App. 2007); Commonwealth v. Gibson, 19 A.3d 512,
519 (Pa. 2011); Commonwealth v. Williams, No. 200001876, 200002869, 2010 Pa. D. & C. 4th. LEXIS
193, at *6–9 (Pa. D. & C. May 13, 2010); Keough v. State, No. W2008-01916-CCA-R3-PD, 2010 WL
2612937, at *13 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 30, 2010).
107. See Mickey v. Ayers, 606 F.3d 1223, 1242–43 (9th Cir. 2010); Jones, 583 F.3d at 634; Hamilton,
583 F.3d at 1127–28; Purkey v. United States, No. 06-8001-CV-W-FJG, 2010 WL 4386532, at *2–3
(W.D. Mo. Oct. 28, 2010); Hawkins v. Wong, No. CV. S-96-1155, 2010 WL 3516399, at *89 (E.D. Cal.
Sept. 2, 2010); Allison, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82957 at *134–36, *145; Morris, 2010 WL 2629738 at *7;
Turner v. Epps, No. 4:07CV77-WAP, 2010 WL 653880, at *13 (N.D. Miss. Feb. 19, 2010); Henry, 2009
WL 692356 at *74; Williams, 2008 WL 4820559 at *14; Wood, 2007 WL 3124451 at *30–31; Schurz,
2007 WL 2808220 at *40–41; Loving, 68 M.J. at 14; Ex parte Smith, No. 1080973, 2010 WL 4148528, at
*4 (Ala. Oct. 22, 2010); Brant, 21 So. 3d at 1280; Hall, 663 S.E.2d at 667; Malone, 168 P.3d at 195;
Keough, 2010 WL 261293, at *13.
108. See Allison, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82957 at *169–71; Henry, 2009 WL 692356 at *65;
Rienhardt v. Ryan, 669 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1052 (D. Ariz. 2009); Berryman, 2007 WL 1991049 at *78.
109. See Detrich, 619 F.3d at 1063; Jones, 583 F.3d at 631; Worthington v. Roper, 619 F. Supp. 2d
661, 682–83 (E.D. Miss. 2009).
110. See Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1404, 1425 (2011) (using family history of alcohol
abuse to support the theory that defendant might have a genetic predisposition to substance abuse and
a family history of mental illness); Hawkins v. Wong, No. CIV S-96-1155 MCE EFB DP, 2010 WL
3516399, at *91 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2010) (showing how a defendant sought a social historian who could
have testified to his family tree, which “included many alcoholics, indicating a family genetic
predisposition to alcoholism . . . [and which also] included many violent, abusive, and mentally ill or
handicapped persons”); Allison, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82957 at *169 (concerning a family history of
alcoholism and depression); Worthington, 619 F. Supp. 2d at 672, 682–83 (exhibiting a defendant with a
family history of depression, bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, and inherited brain dysfunction); Ex
parte Smith, No. 1080973, 2010 WL 4148528, at *4 (Ala. Oct. 22, 2010) (showing use of mental
disability as evidence); Brant, 21 So.3d at 1280 (showing defendant with depression); Hall, 663 S.E.2d
at 667 (concerning a defendant with a substance dependence disorder); Malone, 168 P.3d at 195
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111

the defendant’s relatives as well as through experts. Behavioral
genetics evidence for a number of the cases in my survey was comprised
112
almost entirely of the defendant’s family history, whereas other cases
113
used experts with a broad range of backgrounds and expertise. This
multifaceted approach can help to explain a defendant’s criminally
violent behavior.
114
The defendant in Hawkins v. Wong, for example, successfully
argued that his counsel was ineffective in part for neglecting to hire a social
historian who could have testified about how Hawkins’ background
115
impacted his behavior. Hawkins’ counsel failed to uncover a host of
disorders including the defendant’s genetic predisposition to alcoholism
and mental illness, a childhood comprised of “physical abuse, neglect,
abandonment, and poverty,” and a number of never-treated mental
illnesses such as “depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, attention
116
deficit-hyperactivity disorder, and polysubstance abuse.” The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that such mitigating evidence would
have been instrumental in showing Hawkins’ genetic predisposition to
alcoholism and mental illness, as well as a number of violent, abusive,
117
alcoholic, mentally ill, or disabled persons in his generational history.
The mitigating evidence that counsel overlooked “would have shown that
(concerning a defendant with both addiction and depression); Gibson, 19 A.3d at 519 (exhibiting use
of alcohol abuse as evidence).
111. For expert testimony on behavioral genetics, see, e.g., Henry, 638 F.3d at 1048–49; Detrich,
619 F.3d at 1063; Jones, 583 F.3d at 633–34; Mitchell, 507 F.3d at 944; Morris, 2010 WL 2629738 at *9;
Rienhardt v. Ryan, 669 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1052 (D. Ariz. 2009); Brant, 21 So. 3d at 1283; Simpson v.
State, 3 So. 3d 1135, 1139 (Fla. 2009); Hall, 663 S.E.2d at 667; Malone, 168 P.3d at 195; Gibson, 19 A.3d
at 519; Williams, 2010 Pa. D. & C. 4th LEXIS 193 at *6.
112. See Hawkins, 2010 WL 3516399 at *91 (involving a defendant who sought a social historian
who could have testified to his family tree, which “included many alcoholics, indicating a family
genetic predisposition to alcoholism . . . [and which also] included many violent, abusive, and mentally
ill or handicapped persons”); Allison, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82957 at *169 (suggesting that a
defendant’s family history showed that he might have a genetic predisposition to alcoholism, substance
abuse, and mental illness by means of expert witness testimony); Epps, 2010 WL 653880 at *13
(evidencing a family history of mental illness, including a grandmother who had been diagnosed with
schizophrenia); Worthington, 619 F. Supp. 2d at 682 (showing use of genetic predisposition to and
family history of depression, bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, and inherited brain dysfunction as
evidence); Henry, 2009 WL 692356 at *74 (using defendant’s family history of schizophrenia and
defendant’s symptoms as a child as evidence); Williams, 2008 WL 4820559 at *12 (“’[Defendant]
experienced family dysfunction which extended from generation to generation.’”); Wood, 2007 WL
3124451 at *31 (including evidence of a family history of alcoholism); Gibson, 19 A.3d at 519
(including evidence of a family history of alcohol abuse to support the concept that defendant might
have a genetic predisposition to substance abuse); Keough, 2010 WL 2612937 at *13 (including
testimony by an addiction medicine specialist that alcoholism is genetic and that defendant had a
family history of alcoholism).
113. See supra notes 103–104 and accompanying text.
114. No. CIV S-96-1155 MCE EFB DP, 2010 WL 3516399 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2010).
115. Id. at *91.
116. Id. at *89.
117. Id.
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petitioner was born into a family marked by extreme pathology and
118
The court permitted an
dysfunction over multiple generations.”
119
evidentiary hearing on Hawkins’ ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
This case exemplifies a close interaction between both genetics and
environment in a defendant’s development.
In contrast to the real-life scenario described above, the design of the
sentencing study focuses only on a combination of “psychiatric, genetic,
120
and neurobiological science.” This relatively narrow perspective may
skew the study’s results to show a stronger link among those three factors
than may actually exist, assuming that any link exists at all. Indeed, the
sentencing study fails to control for environmental factors on two levels:
first, the humanizing effect of receiving any additional information about a
defendant, and second, the gene-environment interaction that exists in
basically any real-world criminal case involving behavioral genetics
evidence. I will discuss these levels in turn.
Judges who are aware of additional information regarding a
defendant’s background and behavior may feel more empathy towards
that defendant, and thus hand down a lighter sentence. It would have been
enlightening if the sentencing study’s authors had added a control group
for whom the defendant’s diagnosis of “psychopathy” was replaced with
one that was indicative of an environmentally based condition such as
“neglect.” The authors could have taken a similar approach with the
additional evidence component of the experiment. Environmental
factors, like biological ones, can “contribute to improper brain
121
to borrow a phrase from the sentencing study’s
development,”
hypothetical judges’ instructions. The study’s authors thus could have
added a control group for whom the evidence of an additional
biomechanism was replaced with evidence of an additional enviromechanism. If the sentencing study had been designed in this way, it would
be easier to discern whether the outcome revealed that the judges’
sentencing decisions were influenced by additional biological information
about psychopathy, or simply by additional information which, in and of
itself, may have accompanying humanizing tendencies. A second approach
would be to include environmental factors in the hypothetical fact
pattern and test how they relate to the diagnosis of psychopathy and the
122
additional biomechanism. In sum, any effort to discern the impact of
one type of evidence in a behavioral genetics case must examine the geneenvironment interaction. To create a hypothetical case that separates those

118. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
119. Id. at *92.
120. The Double-Edged Sword, supra note 1, at 849.
121. Supplementary Materials, supra note 11, at 10.
122. See supra notes 102–104 (emphasizing the research significance of the gene-environment
interaction).
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two components—in particular when one component is then ignored—is
to separate a study’s findings from real-world applicability.
This phenomenon is especially apparent when behavioral genetics
evidence is raised in ineffective assistance of counsel claims based, at
least in part, on counsel’s failure to pursue or present mitigating genetics
123
evidence. The results of my survey indicate that behavioral genetics
124
evidence alone is generally insufficient to support such claims. Yet
when that evidence is combined with other evidence, such as
environmental factors, courts appeared far more willing to grant
evidentiary hearings or even to vacate death sentences altogether based
125
on claims of ineffective assistance.
126
In Morales v. Mitchell, for example, the court held that defense
counsel rendered ineffective assistance for failing to conduct an
investigation into mitigating evidence which primarily concerned
information about Morales’ family, Morales’ own alcoholism and its effects
127
on him, and his family upbringing. The district court in Allison v.
128
Cullen also vacated a defendant’s death sentence and granted relief on
his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s failure to
129
including expert testimony that the
present mitigating evidence,
defendant might have a genetic predisposition to alcoholism, substance
130
131
abuse, and mental illness. Likewise, in Hall v. McPherson, the Supreme
Court of Georgia upheld the habeas court’s vacation of McPherson’s death
sentence, claiming that the defendant’s trial counsel should have
investigated further into McPherson’s background, which included a
132
family tree showing a genetic predisposition to substance abuse.
133
In Hamilton v. Ayers, the Ninth Circuit held that Hamilton’s
counsel should have investigated and presented evidence of Hamilton’s
health history, thereby suggesting that counsel’s failure to include
behavioral genetics evidence was a factor for claiming ineffective
134
135
assistance. But the following year, in Mickey v. Ayers, the same court
of appeals that vacated Hamilton’s death sentence affirmed a denial of
habeas for another defendant’s guilt phase and reversed the district

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

See Longitudinal Study, supra note 4, at 994–96, 1015–16.
Id. at 1017.
Id.
507 F.3d 916 (6th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 931, 936.
No. CV 92-06404 CAS, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82957 (C.D. Cal. July 22, 2010).
Id. at *120–21, *177.
Id. at *133, *169.
663 S.E.2d 659 (Ga. 2008).
Id. at 662, 667, 670.
583 F.3d 1100 (9th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 1135–36.
606 F.3d 1223 (9th Cir. 2010).
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court’s grant of habeas relief with respect to the penalty phase. The
district court held that Mickey’s counsel could have made a successful case
with mitigation evidence that Mickey’s genetic propensities, combined
with his family upbringing and mental illness, predisposed him to alcohol
137
and drug dependency. On appeal, however, the Ninth Circuit found that
the second penalty phase expert’s research into genetic links of certain
diseases was in a nascent stage at the time of trial; Mickey’s counsel was
therefore not deficient in failing to provide the expert with Mickey’s family
138
history of substance abuse.
The significance of the gene-environment interaction is by no means
limited to ineffective assistance of counsel claims, as is vividly illustrated by
139
the case of Bradley Waldroup. In 2006, Waldroup killed his wife’s friend
and attempted to kill his wife, actions that the State characterized as
140
intentional and premeditated. Waldroup’s crimes were gruesome. He
shot his wife’s friend eight times, slit open her head, and attacked his wife
141
repeatedly with a machete. Yet a jury declined to sentence him to
142
death. A forensic psychiatrist who evaluated Waldroup on behalf of the
defense testified that Waldroup possessed a particular variant of a
143
deficiency of monoamine oxidase A (“MAOA”). Coincidentally, this is
one of the disorders discovered in the sentencing study’s hypothetical
144
defendant as well. Jurors in the Waldroup case, however, also learned
that Waldroup was severely abused as a child and encountered “stressful
145
life experiences” near the time of his crimes. Expert testimony revealed
that Waldroup’s MAOA deficiency, combined with the abuse he suffered
146
as a child, made him more vulnerable to violent behavior as an adult.
136. Id. at 1248–49.
137. Id. at 1240.
138. Id. at 1247.
139. See Walker & Bernet, supra note 4, at 247 (noting that the Waldroup case “illustrates how
testimony regarding this GxE interaction might help explain the defendant’s behavior and also his
limited capacity to form the intent to commit first-degree murder”).
140. State v. Waldroup, No. E2010-01906-CCA-R3-CD, 2011 WL 5051677, at *1–3 (Tenn. Crim.
App. Oct. 20, 2011); see Barbara Bradley Hagerty, Can Your Genes Make You Murder?, Nat’l Pub.
Radio (July 1, 2010, 12:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=128043329.
141. Waldroup, 2011 WL 5051677 at *1–3; see Hagerty, supra note 140.
142. See Walker & Bernet, supra note 4, at 248; Hagerty, supra note 140. After deliberating for
only eleven hours, the jury convicted Waldroup of aggravated kidnapping, voluntary manslaughter,
and attempted second-degree murder. Waldroup, 2011 WL 5051677 at *1. The trial court sentenced
Waldroup “to an effective sentence of thirty-two years” and the Court of Criminal Appeals of
Tennessee affirmed. Id. at *1.
143. Hagerty, supra note 140. For a discussion of MAOA and other genes of interest to researchers
studying psychopathy, see Tracy D. Gunter et al., Behavioral Genetics in Antisocial Spectrum Disorders
and Psychopathy: A Review of the Recent Literature, 28 Behav. Sci. & L. 148 (2010).
144. See The Double-Edged Sword, supra note 1, at 846.
145. Walker & Bernet, supra note 4, at 248.
146. Hagerty, supra note 140; Walker & Bernet, supra note 4, at 248. Bernet describes the
technical aspects of this interaction as follows: “The genotype revealed that Mr. Waldroup had the
low-activity allele of the MAOA gene (which, together with a history of child maltreatment, put him at
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Testimony regarding this gene-environmental interaction appeared to
have a substantial impact on the jurors, one of whom noted that “[t]here
was more to [Waldroup’s] whole life that led to that moment [of
147
killing].” When asked if the decision was swayed by Waldroup’s genetics,
the juror responded, “Oh I’m sure . . . . And his background—nature vs.
148
nurture.”
In determining the cause of Waldroup’s violent behavior, it would not
be possible to separate the influence of Waldroup’s MAOA deficiency
from the influence of the abuse he suffered as a child. It would also be
difficult to determine the individual influence of these two separate
components on the Waldroup jury’s deliberations. Both components
clearly played a role. But my survey of criminal cases from 2007 to 2011
showed that there have been other cases in which the severity of the
149
defendant’s crime appeared to have overshadowed such considerations.
In one such case involving a defendant who poured gasoline on the victim
150
and then set him on fire, the court acknowledged a range of mitigating
151
However, the court was not
genetic and environmental factors.
convinced that those factors would have hindered the defendant’s ability
152
to control and comprehend his violent actions. One could imagine an
experimental study designed to tease out such distinctions, but that study
would have to account for the inevitable gene-environment interaction.
Part IV attempts to facilitate any such effort by describing several
additional criminal cases that are particularly well-suited to demonstrate
the complexity of the interaction between genetic and environmental
factors.

IV. The Gene-Environment Interaction in Real Cases
This Part begins by discussing two cases from my 2007–2011 survey
in which behavioral genetics evidence was offered to validate the
153
existence of substance and alcohol dependency. I start with these cases
in part because my survey of behavioral genetics cases revealed that
genetics evidence was used to confirm defendants’ substance and alcohol
154
addictions in a striking 61% of all the cases. While most of these cases

increased risk of violent behavior) and had both short and long alleles of the SLC6A4 gene (which,
together with a history of stressful life experiences, put him at an increased risk of depression and
suicidality).” Id. at 248.
147. Hagerty, supra note 140 (internal quotation marks omitted).
148. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
149. See Longitudinal Study, supra note 4, at 1012–14.
150. Schurz v. Schriro, No. CV-97-580-PHX-EHC, 2007 WL 2808220, at *1–2 (D. Ariz. Sept. 25, 2007).
151. Id. at *48–49.
152. Id.
153. See Longitudinal Study, supra note 4, at 1005–08.
154. See Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1404 (2011); Worthington v. Roper, 631 F.3d 487,
493, 501, 510 (8th Cir. 2011); Rhoades v. Henry, 638 F.3d 1027, 1048–49 (9th Cir. 2010); Mickey v.
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also involved a genetic predisposition to other conditions, the alcohol and
substance abuse claims remain predominant and have increased over
155
time. These alcohol and substance dependency challenges are also
wonderful illustrations of the interaction between genes and environment
because both arenas involve many factors.
156
In Schurz v. Schriro, the defendant claimed that his counsel should
have presented evidence concerning the following disorders and
deficiencies: a genetic predisposition toward addiction and mental illness,
possible fetal alcohol syndrome, patterns of alcoholism among family
members including his mother, father, grandfather, grandmother, and
aunts and uncles, devastating parental and physical neglect, and chronic
157
alcohol and substance abuse. The court agreed that the defendant’s
“home environment was dysfunctional” and emphasized the defendant’s
exposure to “his family’s alcoholism, verbal and physical abuse, which
was at times severe, lack of nurturing from his parents, and family fights
158
and violence.” Regardless, the district court denied habeas relief,
suggesting that the sentencing court would have given little weight to the
159
defendant’s dysfunctional family history.
160
In Morales v. Mitchell, however, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the
district court’s finding that the defendant’s counsel was ineffective
because the counsel had failed to conduct an adequate investigation of a
161
broad range of genetic and environmental factors. These factors
included the defendant’s family history of alcoholism, the defendant’s
personal experiences with alcoholism and its repercussions (such as being
prone to blackouts), his upbringing (alcoholic and absent parents, and a
mentally disabled brother), and the “role of alcohol in the Native
162
American Indian culture in which he was raised.” This evidence showed

Ayers, 606 F.3d 1223, 1236, 1247 (9th Cir. 2010); Jones v. Ryan, 583 F.3d 626, 632–34 (9th Cir. 2009);
Morales v. Mitchell, 507 F.3d 916, 931 (6th Cir. 2007); Rienhardt v. Ryan, 669 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1052
(D. Ariz. 2009); Hodges v. Bell, 548 F. Supp. 2d 485, 491 (M.D. Tenn. 2008); Purkey v. United States,
No. 06-8001-CV-W-FJG, 2009 WL 3160774, at *6 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 28, 2010); Allison v. Cullen,
No. CV 92-06404 CAS, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82957, at *169 (C.D. Cal. July 22, 2010); Darling v.
Sec’y, No. 6:07-CV-1701-Orl-31GJK, 2010 WL 2471441, at *22 (M.D. Fla. June 17, 2010); Wood v.
Schriro, No. CV-98-053-TUC-JMR, 2007 WL 3124451, at *45 (D. Ariz. Oct. 24, 2007); Schurz, 2007
WL 2808220 at *40–41; Berryman v. Ayers, No. 1:95-CV-05309-AWI, 2007 WL 1991049, at *17 (E.D.
Cal. July 10, 2007); Loving v. United States, 68 M.J. 1, 14–15 (2009); Simpson v. State, 3 So. 3d 1135,
1139 (Fla. 2009); Hall v. McPherson, 663 S.E.2d 659, 667 (Ga. 2008); Malone v. State, 168 P.3d 185, 195
(Okla. Crim. App. 2007); Commonwealth v. Gibson, 19 A.3d 512, 519 (Pa. 2011); Keough v. State,
No. W2008-01916-CCA-R3-PD, 2010 WL 2612937, at *36 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 30, 2010).
155. See Longitudinal Study, supra note 4, at 1005–06.
156. No. CV-97-580-PHX-EHC, 2007 WL 2808220 (D. Ariz. Sept. 25, 2007).
157. Id. at *41.
158. Id. at *48.
159. Id. at *49.
160. 507 F.3d 916 (6th Cir. 2007).
161. Id. at 931–34.
162. Id. at 931.
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that the defendant’s parents, grandparents, uncle, and aunts were
163
alcoholics, and that several relatives had died from cirrhosis of the liver.
Such mitigation evidence contributed to the court’s determination that the
defendant was entitled to a writ of habeas corpus and his death sentence
164
was vacated.
When the gene-environment interaction arises in cases in which
genetics evidence is used for reasons other than alcoholism and substance
dependency, the cases can become far more complex. In Creech v.
165
Hardison, for example, the defendant claimed ineffective assistance of
counsel at his resentencing hearing because his counsel did not adequately
166
research mitigation evidence. At the rehearing, a psychologist testified
“that Creech probably had a genetic or biological predisposition for
167
violence.” The testimony was based on the defendant’s mental health
168
reports, various records and psychological tests, and an interview. Creech
also suffered from “an antisocial personality and scored in the 96th
169
percentile of the prison population for psychopathy.”
As damning as this latter evidence may appear, it was offered for
mitigation purposes during the sentencing hearing for Creech’s murder
of a fellow prison inmate while Creech was already serving a life
170
sentence for murder. On appeal, Creech also introduced new evidence
from a 2005 neurological examination showing that he had “bilateral
brain damage that affected [his] insight, judgment and capacity to
171
exercise social inhibitions.” The court nonetheless concluded that such
172
mitigating circumstances had already been considered, adding that
although a “neurologist’s opinion that Creech has brain damage may be
more specific than [the psychologist’s] testimony,” it offered “only a
modest counterweight” to the aggravating factors involved in Creech’s
173
case. These factors included Creech’s long criminal record and the
“brutal manner” in which he killed his more vulnerable victim “over a
174
petty dispute.” Creech had murdered the other prisoner by hitting him
175
with a battery-filled sock and then stomping on his head and neck.

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id. at 932–33.
Id. at 942.
No. CV 99-0224-S-BLW, 2010 WL 1338126 (D. Idaho Mar. 31, 2010).
Id. at *10.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *1, *10.
Id. at *14 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. at *15.
Id.
Id. at *1.
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176

Brant v. State is another complicated case involving the interaction
of genetic and environmental evidence. A forensic psychiatrist for the
defense testified that Brant suffered from a condition known as sexual
sadism, which “in most cases . . . arises out of a genetic predisposition and
177
unhealthy childhood environment.” With respect to Brant’s conviction
for sexual battery, the psychiatrist explained that Brant possessed “a
substantial impairment in his ability to conform his conduct to the
requirements of the law” because Brant’s sexual sadism and the effects of
178
179
methamphetamine fueled his sexual impulses. A PET scan of Brant’s
brain also showed “underactivity” in areas associated with impulse control
180
The Florida Supreme Court concluded that
and good judgment.
mitigating factors did not outweigh aggravating factors and affirmed
Brant’s death sentence, but did not turn the behavioral genetics evidence
into a tool for aggravation.
The complexity of these cases relative to the Donahue hypothetical
bears emphasizing, given that the sentencing study’s authors attempted
to present a difficult scenario. In Creech and Brant, the evidence related
to behavioral genetics (such as psychopathy) may appear aggravating at
first but could potentially serve as mitigating factors when examined
181
through a different lens. These cases illustrate that the interaction
between genetic and environmental factors—and the kinds of balances in
which courts are engaged—are far more intricate than the sentencing
study recognized. Moreover, analysis of these and other real criminal
cases involving behavioral genetics evidence suggests that it would be
extremely difficult to isolate a single piece of information as being likely
to lead either to a particular outcome or to categorically affect a fact
finder’s deliberations.

Conclusion
The sentencing study’s authors may interpret the effects of genetics
182
evidence in their single-hypothetical study as a double-edged sword,
but it is not at all clear that there is any support for such a simplistic
perspective in actual case law. Nor are the evidentiary hurdles the same
for each side of that sword. It is much more difficult for the State to
prove that genetic factors will predict a defendant’s future dangerousness
than it is for the defense to introduce such information to suggest why a
defendant should not be executed. When asked about her opinion of the

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

21 So. 3d 1276 (Fla. 2009).
Id. at 1282.
Id. at 1283 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. at 1281.
See Longitudinal Study, supra note 4, at 1033 chart 5.
See generally The Double-Edged Sword, supra note 1.
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sentencing study, psychologist Jennifer Skeem explained that “any
tendency toward reduced sentences for psychopathic convicts in a survey
would be weaker in actual courtrooms where judges hear evidence
183
contested by prosecutors and defense attorneys.”
I emphasize again that my survey of criminal cases involving
behavioral genetics evidence did not reveal a single case in which such
evidence was used to support the likelihood of a defendant’s future
184
dangerousness. This outcome puts into perspective the sentencing
study’s findings regarding genetics and future dangerousness, as well as
185
related concerns expressed by some courts. Furthermore, I am aware of
no case in which the State introduced behavioral genetics evidence in any
186
capacity, much less as an aggravating factor. To the contrary, my survey
indicates that only defense attorneys introduced behavioral genetics
evidence into court. This finding alone speaks volumes regarding each
side’s perspective on the utility and relevance of genetic factors to their
respective cases.
Yet misconceptions abound regarding the role of genetics evidence
in the criminal courts. Media reports of the Bradley Waldroup case, for
example, tended to focus exclusively on testimony related to the
defendant’s genetic makeup rather than his childhood suffering, or even
the impact of the latter on the former. One headline posed the question:
187
“Can Your Genes Make You Murder?” Another provided a mocking
188
response: “Pity the Poor Murderer, His Genes Made Him Do it.” Such
depictions propagate the myth that genetics evidence renders a
defendant no longer responsible for his actions. They also reinforce a
lopsided emphasis on the singular power of genetics testimony,
regardless of whatever other evidence may have been offered during the
guilt or penalty phases of a criminal trial. Unfortunately, the sentencing

183. See Bower, supra note 2.
184. See Longitudinal Study, supra note 4, at 996.
185. See Landrigan v. Stewart, 272 F.3d 1221, 1229 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[A]lthough Landrigan’s new
evidence can be called mitigating in some slight sense, it would also have shown the court that it could
anticipate that he would continue to be violent. He had already done that to a fare-thee-well. The
prospect was chilling; before he was 30 years of age, Landrigan had murdered one man, repeatedly
stabbed another one, escaped from prison, and within two months murdered still another man. . . . On this
record, assuring the court that genetics made him the way he is could not have been very helpful.”). The
Supreme Court quoted the Ninth Circuit’s latter phrases, stating that it could not explain the reasoning
any better. See Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 481 (2007) (“The prospect was chilling; before he was
30 years of age, Landrigan had murdered one man, repeatedly stabbed another one, escaped from prison,
and within two months murdered still another man. . . . On this record, assuring the court that genetics
made him the way he is could not have been very helpful.” (quoting Landrigan, 272 F.3d at 1229)).
186. See Longitudinal Study, supra note 4, at 993–96.
187. See Hagerty, supra note 140.
188. Nigel Barber, Pity the Poor Murderer, His Genes Made Him Do It, Psychol. Today (July 13,
2010), http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-human-beast/201007/pity-the-poor-murderer-his-genesmade-him-do-it.
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study plays into these erroneous beliefs by examining only genetics factors
relating to its hypothetical defendant. The potential for misleading results
and inaccurate interpretations increases when this narrow focus is pursued
in the context of a research design that methodologically loads the dice in
favor of finding a genetics impact on judges. In addition, in some instances
the sentencing study’s methodological flaws are so pervasive that it is
difficult to decipher the authors’ goals and findings, thereby heightening
the prospect that the study’s results could be simplified and misinterpreted.
Admittedly, it is no small task to design a study that experimentally
tests aspects of the relationships between genetics, crime, and sentencing.
Behavioral genetics is multifaceted and incorporates a broad range of
189
themes such as genetics, biology, psychology, sociology, and statistics.
A highly interdisciplinary field emerges when the intricacies of the
criminal justice system are added to the mix. The relationships among
the topic areas that comprise this field are complex, and there is a vital
need for more insight. The sentencing study is a pioneering attempt to
impart new information. In providing a springboard for future similar
efforts, the authors of this study have contributed a great deal to both
behavioral genetics and the criminal law.

189. For a broad overview of these kinds of interdisciplinary relationships, see generally Gregory
Cary, Human Genetics for the Social Sciences (2003); Plomin et al., supra note 104.

